White House Press Briefing by Dana Perino 06/22/07 VIDEO PODVAST

Press Briefing by Dana Perino, FULL STREAMING VIDEO, PODCAST OF THIS ARTICLE White House Conference Center Briefing Room, Dana M. Perino Biography, 1:26 P.M. EDT. MS. PERINO: Happy Friday. One quick announcement

Today the governor of Wyoming appointed John Barrasso to fill the vacancy caused by the unfortunate death of U.S. Senator Craig Thomas. The President looks forward to working with Mr. Barrasso as he begins his work on behalf of our nation and the people of Wyoming. I should say Senator Barrasso. If there is more to update on that later, we'll get it to you.

Q Does the President think that the Information Security Oversight Office should be abolished?

MS. PERINO: No, and I don't think that anyone has suggested that. I went back and I looked at this EO -- I don't know if anyone else had a chance to actually read it. I think one thing is clear: first of all, it's the President of the United States who is the author of the EO, and is the sole enforcer of the EO, the executive order on classified materials. And it's clear from the reading of it, the Vice President is not treated separately from the President in the EO. Agencies are treated separately, for just the small section on this ISOO provision. Everything else does apply, except for that one section, for the Vice President.

Q Including the reporting provision?

MS. PERINO: Correct.

Q So that -- he is exempt from reporting? You support --

MS. PERINO: If you look at the EO, the President, in the performance of executive duties, and the Vice President are treated separately from agencies. The President did not intend -- I went back and looked into this -- the President did not intend for the Vice President to be treated separately from how he would treat himself. Agencies are to report to ISOO, and they do. I don't think there's any suggestion that no one else is complying. The Vice President was not intended to be separate from the President in this regard.

Q But part of the rationale the Vice President's office gave is that as President of the Senate, he's part of the legislative branch, almost distancing himself from the executive branch.

MS. PERINO: I saw those reports yesterday, as well, and I think that while that's an interesting constitutional discussion about the separation of powers and different branches, between executive branch and legislative branch, and different functions, under the role -- as his unique role as the Vice President of the United States. The point of Chairman Waxman's letter yesterday regarded this small portion of an executive order of which the President is the sole enforcer, and of which he did not intend for the President [sic] to be treated separately from himself.

Q I'm a little confused here. Is the President's office and the Vice President's office, are they handling this the same way? In other words, Waxman was asserting that the Vice President's office was saying, we don't want to be inspected to make sure that we are following the procedures laid out in this EO. Is the President -- does he feel the same way?

MS. PERINO: The President and the Vice President are complying with all the rules and regulations regarding the handling of classified material and making sure that it is safeguarded and protected.

What is different is, regarding that small section of this ISOO office, that they are not subject to those -- they are subordinate to the sole enforcer of the EO, which is the President of the United States, and they are not subject to such investigation -- as I understand it, as I read the EO and as I had preliminary discussions in between the gaggle and today.

Q Well, then why did the Vice President not have any issue with this in 2001, 2002?

MS. PERINO: That I don't know. All I know is what I have here, which is the executive order that was released in 2002, I think, did not intend to treat the Vice President any differently than he would treat the President.

Q So what are you saying? That he --

Q Yes, Dana, what are you saying? So the President supports the Vice President saying that he doesn't want these inspections?

MS. PERINO: I don't think that he -- it's not a matter of wanting, it's a matter of who's subject to them. And I think that it's important to remember, the Vice President, his office yesterday said that they are in full compliance with all laws regarding classified materials, as is this President, and the President expects that of everyone here at the White House and of all the agencies across the executive branch that handle classified information.

Q Then why isn't it public?

Q So is he supporting -- so he's supporting what the Vice President is doing, by saying he's not part of the executive branch --

MS. PERINO: If you go back and you read the EO, it's -- the President's intention was never to separate the Vice President out from himself. The President, as the sole enforcer of the EO, is instructing agencies on how to handle classified material on a range of issues. The issue that we're talking about yesterday -- that Chairman Waxman was talking about in his letter yesterday is a very narrow one.

Q But the people at the National Archives say that they are meeting with resistance from the Vice President's office, and only the Vice President's office, not from the White House, not from the Office of the President.

MS. PERINO: That's what I just said, I don't think that there's any -- I don't think there's been any complaint about compliance, except for, in this regards, to the Vice President's office. And as I just said, the President's intention was not to have him separate. If you read that, that's clear in the EO. In the EO, as well, the ISOO does have the capability to go to the Department of Justice and ask for an opinion, of which they have done.

Q They did that in January and still haven't heard anything.

MS. PERINO: You'll have to put that question to the Department of Justice.

Q So that they have to apply to the President for any documents that the Vice President has charge of.

MS. PERINO: All of the -- all of the President -- all of the President's documents and all the Vice President's documents are safeguarded, they are held, they are held in the Archives as part of the Presidential Records Act. And all of those rules and regulations are followed.

This small section regarding just the reporting requirements to the group that -- the ISOO that's out of the National Archives is different.

Q Why? He's a public servant, paid by us. He's accountable.

MS. PERINO: And all the laws and regulations regarding classified materials are being complied with. And that's what you, as a taxpayer, should expect.

Q How do we know that?

MS. PERINO: Because I think that if there weren't, there are other ways for people to challenge and find out.

Q Dana, what do you make of what Congressman Waxman referred to as "absurd," which was the Vice President's contention that his office is not part of the executive branch?

MS. PERINO: As I said, I think that that is an interesting constitutional question that people can debate. What I think is absurd is --

Q But do you agree with his contention?

MS. PERINO: -- it's -- I think what was heard is Chairman Waxman --

Q Hang on a second, do you agree with the --

MS. PERINO: -- asserting -- I think what's absurd is Chairman Waxman asserting --

Q Hang on a second. Do you think with --

MS. PERINO: I think what is absurd is Chairman Waxman asserting some sort of authority over the President regarding an executive order, of which he is the sole enforcer.

Q Do you agree with the contention that the Office of the Vice President is not part of the executive branch?

MS. PERINO: What I know -- and I am not a lawyer; and this is an interesting constitutional question that legal scholars can debate and I'm sure you'll find plenty of them inside the beltway -- is that the Vice President has a unique role in our United States government. He is not only the Vice President of the United States, but in that role he is also the President of the Senate. I will let him go ahead and --

Q So there's a fourth branch of government.

MS. PERINO: -- I will let that debate be held. But what I'm answering questions on in regard to this morning was Chairman Waxman's accusations about this small provision, going back and reading the EO and realizing that the President did not intend to have the Vice President treated any differently than himself; and remembering that the executive order is enforced solely by the President of the United States. I think this is a little bit of a non-issue.

Q But, Dana, the director of the Information Security Oversight Office, in his letter to the Attorney General, says that the Vice President's office did initially comply in 2001 and 2002, and then stopped complying. They view that the Vice President's office should be participating and is not, and further suggest that the response from Counsel to the Vice President was to eliminate the role of this office in handling and supervising how these classified documents are dealt with.

MS. PERINO: I am not disputing that there is a dispute in regards to how this executive order should be -- who should comply with the executive order in regards to ISOO's questions about the Vice President's office. They have the right to seek a clarification from the Department of Justice, of which they've asked for. That has nothing to do with the President or our office, in terms of the timing of when that's released. I'll ask you to take that to the Department of Justice; I haven't talked to them about that today.

Q Does the President think the Vice President is too secretive?

MS. PERINO: I think the President thinks that the Vice President is a great representor of the United States and that he complies with all the laws regarding secret documents, classified documents, and that he's someone who truly believes in the institution of the presidency and in keeping that intact.

Q Does the President think that the Vice President -- does he agree with the Vice President's handling of this matter?

MS. PERINO: I don't see any reason not to agree with it, especially --

Q So that's a yes?

MS. PERINO: -- when you read the plain face of the EO.

Q So he's not going to tell him --

Q And he's not concerned at all that there's too much secrecy; that he complied with it before; or why he wouldn't want to do the same thing he was doing before?

MS. PERINO: I think that what the President wants to make sure of is that all of the rules and regulations regarding classified materials are being followed, and he is assured that that is the case.

Q Even though it's still being looked at, and even though they're looking at this as an executive branch?

MS. PERINO: I don't think there's a question of the handling of the documents. I think there's a question of the reporting. In the handling of the documents, we are confident that we are in full compliance.

Q And does he have concerns about the reporting?

MS. PERINO: I didn't talk to him about that. I don't believe so. Especially since, as I just said in the EO, he's the sole enforcer of the EO, and he never intended for the Vice President to be treated separately from himself.

Alexis.

Q Dana, can I just clarify -- since he's the sole enforcer of this executive order, was the White House's Counsels Office knowledgeable about the letter trail, the dispute trail, when you consulted them today to ask about --

MS. PERINO: Well, as you know, I think that this letter trail goes back many years, and we have a new Counsel and many new people in the Counsel's Office. So I'm not exactly clear on that.

Q But you have members of the Counsel's Office who preceded Mr. Fielding, so I'm curious, when you consulted, can we write or say that the White House Counsel's Office, on behalf of the President, was fully knowledgeable of the dispute before --

MS. PERINO: I can't tell you that right now, because I don't know, but I can check. There are a lot of new people, and I can't tell you that the people that I talked to were here before.

Q But, I mean, there could have been a paper trail --

MS. PERINO: I'll go back and check. The people I talked to weren't necessarily here before.

Q Can we just go back to this phrase that the President never intended for the Vice President to be treated any differently than -- I'll confess, I'm missing the whole thing here. The Vice President is not getting treated any differently, he's acting differently, according to the National Archive.

MS. PERINO: No, but in the EO, who is directed and how they respond -- if you look on page 18 of the EO, when you have a chance, there's a distinction regarding the Vice President versus what is an agency. And the President also, as the author of an EO, and the person responsible for interpreting the EO, did not intend for the Vice President to be treated as an agency, and that's clear.

Q But the Archive doesn't have an issue with, say, the way the President is handling this; the inspectors, the procedures, the protocols are all being followed. It's the Vice President who is acting differently.

MS. PERINO: Right, but that's because the President never -- the President treats him differently in this EO, separate from an agency. And again, I'm not disputing that there's a dispute that the ISOO has with the Vice President's office, and they have a right under this EO to take that to the Justice Department. But the Vice President was not to be treated -- to be interpreted to be treated separately from the President in this executive order.

Q Can we expect to hear from the Vice President as to why his office did comply for two years, and then made a decision to stop complying?

Q Bring David in here.

Q Why is it separate?

MS. PERINO: If I could -- I'll ask the Vice President if he'll come to the press briefing room and answer your questions.

Q Wow.

Q I mean, it is a little curious that all of this -- this breaks, and all we get is like a line response from the Office of the Vice President, we're confident that everything is kosher. I mean, I --

MS. PERINO: I'm here today to try to flesh it out a little bit more for you, and I'm doing the best I can with all that I've got.

Q But why does the Vice President not want to be seen to be in compliance?

MS. PERINO: There's no question that he is in compliance, in terms of the meat of the issue, which is classified -- the handling of classified documents. It's just simply a matter of a small portion of an executive order regarding reporting requirements, of which he is not subject to, and -- the interpretation of the EO.

Q But if he's not monitored, we don't know that --

Q Why isn't he subject to this?

MS. PERINO: Because the President gets to decide whether or not he should be treated separately, and he's decided that he should.

Q Why did the President decide that he shouldn't be subjected to this?

MS. PERINO: And if you look at the EO, throughout the Vice President's office is called out on many other issues, and making sure that they are complying, just as with any other agency. But in this regard, it's different.

Q But if he's not monitored, how do we know that, that he's in compliance?

MS. PERINO: I think there are many other ways -- I'm not a lawyer, but --

Q How? Because it's not as though --

MS. PERINO: Well, Victoria, maybe we can let you in there and you can have an interview and check out his classified materials.

Q The office is not giving away information.

MS. PERINO: Right, they're not giving away classified information, either.

Q Who is making sure they're in compliance?

MS. PERINO: That's a good question. I'm not positive.

Q But you can stand up there and say they're in compliance, but you don't know why or how or who is checking on it.

MS. PERINO: What I said is that the Vice President's office says that they are in compliance, and I can tell you on behalf of the President that we are in compliance with all matters regarding classified materials.

Q And it's just them saying we're in compliance?

MS. PERINO: I'll see if there's any other ways. The ISOO is not the only -- I would believe that ISOO is not the only agency that can check that.

Q Dana, when you make requests to the OVP about this, could you please specify that the big, large, takeaway question is, why no problem in 2001, 2002, and it starts in 2003? Does it have to do with the war, does it have to do with Scooter Libby, does this have to do with what? Why then?

MS. PERINO: I will check into it. I don't know when -- I don't know why the change, and I'll see if there was any different interpretation --

Q Why is an exemption at all? Why is he exempt?

MS. PERINO: He's not exempt from following the laws of the United States. He's exempt just from this reporting requirement in this particular executive order.

Q And why was an announcement not made back then when they stopped reporting, that in fact this was the case, that he was to be treated the same as the President?

MS. PERINO: Why wasn't there a press release announcing it?

Q Yes.

MS. PERINO: We issued the EO. You could have -- it says it right here. It was released publicly.

Q There was no announcement like this. In other words, nobody knew.

MS. PERINO: I think that's kind of a backwards way to treat us. We could go back through and we could find any possible EO that the President has issued in the past seven years, and try to figure out, maybe the press might be interested in this five years from now. I think that's a little bit of a stretch to require us -- I think that we put out information, and you're welcome to read it.

Q What was the date of the EO?

MS. PERINO: Go ahead, Elaine.

Q I was going to ask, these questions, obviously, were kind of percolating yesterday, as well, when we were all asking the Vice President's office about this. Why didn't they cite page 18 of this executive order?

MS. PERINO: Well, I was on the road, and I was with the President in Alabama, and I got back today and was able to get you what I can, right now. I worked hard to do it.

Q Can we go on to Guantanamo? Was there a meeting scheduled for today to discuss Guantanamo?

MS. PERINO: There's meetings scheduled regularly to talk about Guantanamo, they happen frequently, they happen often, because people are charged with the responsibilities that the President has given them to try to close down that facility. Yes, there was going to be a meeting today, but there was a determination that it wasn't needed.

Q Was it because of the AP story?

MS. PERINO: I think that the decision to make -- to not have the meeting happened late in the day after that story came out.

Q So it was because of that?

MS. PERINO: What I can tell you is that meeting was not a decisional meeting, there was nothing imminent coming out of that meeting, and that there are people who are charged with -- tasked with working on this issue every day, not only here at the White House, but at the Defense Department, State Department and other agencies, to make sure that we are figuring out a way to repatriate these individuals, so they can go back to their countries in a way that we can make sure that they're going to be held, and not a threat to anybody else, as well as be treated humanely.

Q Are you nearing a decision? Was there anything different about this meeting? Are the meetings and the attendees -- and the Secretary of State? Was there something different? Was this going to be a focus?

MS. PERINO: Well, the meeting was going to be focusing on doing what the President has asked them to do for the past few years, which is work to get the facility closed. I think that -- I think that report was overblown. There was not an imminent decision made. There's no deadline. There was just a regular meeting.

Q It didn't really say it was imminent. I mean --

MS. PERINO: It did say it was imminent.

Q Why would you -- they said they were nearing a decision. Why would you cancel a meeting after a press report about that?

MS. PERINO: Look, there was a decision that a meeting wasn't necessary. But that should not lead you to think that there aren't people who are either talking about it today or working towards it. In fact, I think today --

Q I'm sorry, but why wasn't the meeting necessary? I mean, the timing was a little strange, and then the White House was able to say, there's no meeting scheduled for tomorrow, when you start getting press reports. Was the meeting canceled because of the press report?

MS. PERINO: I wasn't there to decide why the meeting was canceled. All I know is that the meeting was canceled, it wasn't -- I was told that it wasn't necessary to have it. For example, today, we released -- we got six people back -- out of Guantanamo today, two to Tunisia and four to Yemen. This process is ongoing. There's 375 there now; there used to be over 600. We're working on getting people back. I think we've got 80 out of 375 that are about to leave.

And so this is an issue that we're working on. We're trying to ratchet it down, but we have folks like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks who are down there, and we want to see them tried through the Military Commissions Act.

Q How close are you to a firm decision about the closing of Guantanamo?

MS. PERINO: There has been a firm decision. The President gave a firm decision two years ago in which he said, I want this place closed --

Q But can you give us --

MS. PERINO: -- that the United States should not be the world's jailers. Those are his words.

Q But the question after yesterday that everyone's wondering is, we're trying to get a sense of what is imminent. So it is -- is there going to be an announcement -- I know you're not going to give me a calendar date, but next week are we going to hear that the announcement -- is he going to step out and tell us that Guantanamo is going to be closed?

MS. PERINO: Not that I'm aware of. What I can tell is that these matters are very complex on how you get individuals who are picked up on the battlefield to be taken back by their home countries. A lot of people have complained about Guantanamo Bay around the world, but many of these countries don't want to take them back, don't want to take their individuals back, or we can't get the assurances that they're going to be treated humanely.

And so while the President has said we want to make sure that we close this facility as quickly as possible, he's not put a deadline on it because they're complex issues; we have to make sure that we handle it appropriately.

Q And does it take weeks to work those complex issues out, months?

MS. PERINO: Well, look, since 2002, over 400 detainees have been sent back -- or put back -- sent back to their countries, and they're either serving their time there or they have served their time.

Q What are they charged with? What are they -- what did they do?

MS. PERINO: These are unlawful enemy combatants that intended to harm the United States or other Western civilization --

Q That we have designated -- were they defending their own country?

MS. PERINO: No, I don't think they were. They were intending to hurt innocent people.

Q This isn't a matter of thinking. Do you know?

MS. PERINO: Mark, you're on this topic?

Q Yes, can you describe the purpose of the Afghan facility that the United States is now involved with?

MS. PERINO: Well, we've been working closely to renovate a prison. Let me give you the name of it -- Pole Charki. This was to renovate a part of that prison and to train up enough of the guards in order to take care of those -- that section of the prison. And so we're working just to renovate that. That's the purpose of it.

As you can imagine, many of the detainees that we have in Guantanamo Bay are from Afghanistan, and we'd like for them to be able to go back to be held securely and to make sure that they are being treated humanely.

Q So how should we look on this particular facility, as a partial replacement for Guantanamo, as an alternative, as a place --

MS. PERINO: No. No, I think that, just as with any other country that we have asked to take back their prisoners and to hold them accountable, I would look at it that way. Afghanistan is a sovereign government, and we've asked other governments to take their folks back. As I said, we sent two back to -- let's see, it was four to Yemen and two to Tunisia; I think of it in the same way. But Afghanistan has a slightly different problem, because, one, their facilities were so run down and their infrastructure, plus there were so many of them from Afghanistan. They have to send them -- be sent back.

Q You've spoken of repatriation. But you're not going to repatriate everybody who's at Guantanamo. Ultimately, you're going to be left with some who you are going to put elsewhere. Are you still looking at places to bring them to in America?

MS. PERINO: Not that I'm aware of.

Q Not at all?

MS. PERINO: Not that I'm aware of.

Q Or, in other words --

MS. PERINO: There's the Military Commissions Act that's working through -- there's a different process where you have to be -- you go through a naming process where you are deemed an unlawful enemy combatant, and then you go forward to trial, and those things are underway. It takes a long time, though.

Q Just to be clear, if I'm understanding you right, none of the people who are at Guantanamo now, there is no consideration being given to bringing any of those people to U.S. soil?

MS. PERINO: I think the way that I should answer that is to say, that's a very complex legal question. The Attorney General has been asked this question before; I would refer you to his public comments. And I'm not going to comment here about what is under consideration or not. It's one of the reasons that meeting -- meeting that was going to be today and other meetings that we have on this are private.

Q Dana, one of the lawyers representing a couple of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay said that it's a bunch of doublespeak from this White House saying that you want to close Guantanamo Bay when indeed you're not giving due process to many of the detainees that are there.

MS. PERINO: Well, I just told you that since 2002, we have had over 400 detainees go back to their home countries. And we also have a Military Commissions Act process underway to deal with those who have not gone back to their countries and those that we want to try, like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Q I hear what you're saying, but people who are working with the detainees are saying you are not allowing them to go to tribunal, you're not allowing them to have due process, as you were saying, you're not speeding up the process to get rid of these remaining 375 detainees.

MS. PERINO: I strongly disagree, and I'd refer you to Department of Defense, who has dedicated a serious amount of personnel and assets in order to be able to move these trials along.

Q And I want to ask something else. Tony Snow, within the last couple of weeks, he was asked a question, realistically, do you think that this President could close Guantanamo Bay before his term is up? He said no. What will change -- what conditions could change that, from what he said a month ago?

MS. PERINO: Well, I think I'm going to go back to what I said to Mark, which is a lot of very smart people are working on that issue, trying to figure out a way that we could close Guantanamo in a way that makes sure that those who are there are held securely and that they are treated humanely.

Q Held securely where, though? I mean, in U.S. custody where?

MS. PERINO: I never said that they were going to be held in the U.S. I'm not commenting --

Q U.S. custody where?

MS. PERINO: Well, right now they're in Guantanamo, and then we'll just have to see from where we go. One of the reasons that these meetings, these interagency meetings are held is to discuss these very complex issues. And it's not something I'm able or prepared to give to you today.

Q If, in fact, there is no decision imminent on Guantanamo, has the administration begun to accelerate or intensify its discussions about the future of that facility in light of the continuing international criticism and legal setbacks?

MS. PERINO: What I know -- you look at what the President has said and what he has directed to his Cabinet, which is, close this facility as soon as possible, people take that very seriously. There are people who have -- their full-time job is to work on how do you move these individuals out of the Guantanamo Bay facility into places where they can be held securely and treated humanely. And so there's not a deadline on it. We're doing it in a way that is responsible.

Q The President expressed his concerns to the Vietnamese President about the human rights record in Vietnam. Did the Vietnamese President turn the tables on the President, as President Putin did recently, and mention that there's some questions that have been raised internationally about the U.S.'s record on Guantanamo?

MS. PERINO: No. And I can tell you that we are confident that people are treated humanely at Guantanamo Bay.

Q I'm sorry -- the holding of prisoners indefinitely without charge is considered worldwide to be a violation of human rights, so --

MS. PERINO: What the President has said is that if there are -- one, we'll do the military commissions, which are underway; two, this was a matter where we had never dealt with this before. We have an enemy who does not conform to any of the traditional rules of law. But we also knew that we couldn't leave them out there on the battlefield. Their intent was to kill innocent people.

And so the President has done the responsible thing. And I would submit to you that countries who have complained most vehemently about the human rights record, alleged abuses of human rights at Guantanamo Bay are the very ones who refuse to take any prisoners themselves.

Q Staying on Guantanamo?

MS. PERINO: Yes.

Q Currently at Guantanamo Bay, there are no prisoners designated as unlawful enemy combatants. The military commission process is at a dead stop. There is nothing on the books to continue, because the question -- both cases that have been brought before the commissions have been thrown out because the judges have said they do not have jurisdiction over enemy combatants, which everybody at Guantanamo Bay is listed as enemy combatant. Before the process can be undertaken to move Guantanamo to Fort Leavenworth, or wherever it's going to go, does everybody first have to be redesignated?

MS. PERINO: I don't know. That's great questions for Department of Defense legal counsel. Don't know.

Q Because that could be a question of years.

MS. PERINO: Les.

Q Thank you, Dana. Two questions. In his statement, "all human life is sacred," the President deplored what he termed, "the deliberate destruction of human embryos." And my question: If a pregnant woman is medically diagnosed as facing death, unless she has a therapeutic abortion, does the President believe it is wrong to destroy the fetus to save the life of the mother?

MS. PERINO: I think that we've made public comments on this before regarding the health of the mother. And you're raising complex ethical questions, which I'd refer you to the NIH to ask.

Q Well, all right. Is the President opposed to the destruction of any embryo resulting from gang rape or incest?

MS. PERINO: I think we've made comments on that, too, Les. We'll get you those from before.

Q He's made them before?

MS. PERINO: Yes, I'll get those for you. Go ahead.

Q Is the President happy with the discussion of human rights with the Vietnamese President? And if the situation is not changed, what else can he do?

MS. PERINO: Well, the President had a good meeting with President Triet, and it was one of the first issues that he brought up, was human rights and religious freedom. And so the President hopes that the Vietnamese President will take those word to heart and that we'll see some behavior changes in Vietnam.

Q In New York, the Vietnamese President mentioned four people who were arrested in Vietnam were criminals, not dissidents. Did President Bush persuade him to change that view, in that one-hour meeting?

MS. PERINO: I don't know the specifics, because I didn't sit in on that meeting, but I'll consult and see if we can get back to you. Just give me your card after this.

Q Thank you.

END 1:55 P.M. EDT

For Immediate Release, Office of the Press Secretary, June 22, 2007

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Russia and U.S.-Russia Relations VIDEO PODCAT

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Remarks before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FULL STREAMING VIDEO, Washington, DC. June 21, 2007 PODCAST OF THIS ARTICLE

As Prepared, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you to discuss Russia and U.S.-Russia relations.

Russia is a great country, one we must work with on important issues around the world. We have significant areas of common interest and want to build on these. We also have significant differences with certain policies of the current Russian government. This hearing is well timed, because we are in a more complicated period in our relations with Russia than we've been in some time.

Our differences notwithstanding, Russia today is not the Soviet Union. As President Bush has said, the Cold War is over. But the world has witnessed a series of statements and initiatives from Russian officials in recent months that have left us puzzled and in some cases concerned.

In the past few months, Russian leaders and senior officials have, in quick succession:

Threatened to suspend Russia's obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty;

Criticized U.S. plans for a modest missile defense system based in Europe and rejected our explanation that it is intended to counter potential threats from Iran, only to propose missile defense cooperation in Azerbaijan;

Attacked U.S. agreements with Romania and Bulgaria to establish joint training facilities in those countries, even though this would involve no permanent stationing of U.S. forces;

Left the impression that there's no will to find a realistic, prompt resolution of Kosovo's final status;

Threatened the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova by giving renewed support to separatist regimes and issuing veiled threats to recognize breakaway regions in those countries.

Further restricted freedom of assembly and association by preventing peaceful demonstrations as well as hindering the operation of organizations such as Internews.

These and other policy concerns have been accompanied by an inconsistent but still worrying toughening of Russian rhetoric about the United States, Europe, and some of Russia's neighbors. The Russian media - increasingly state controlled - frequently paint an "enemy picture" of the United States. We have seen Russian efforts to strengthen monopoly control over energy resources in Central Asia and a willingness to use this control for political purposes. All these concerns, moreover, occur against a background of a steady deterioration of democratic practices within Russia.

In this context, some observers have suggested that Russia's relations with the West are at a post-Cold War low. Yet in other critical areas, our cooperation is advancing. These include:

Nonproliferation (including nuclear);

North Korea and Iran;

Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement-and here I'd like to commend Senator Biden for his proposal to create an international nuclear forensics library;

Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, which result from Nunn-Lugar legislation;

NATO-Russia Council (including the Status of Forces Agreement recently approved by the Russian Duma and President Putin);

Some investment and business opportunities; and

Progress in negotiations on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, including conclusion of our bilateral WTO market access agreement in November 2006.
Against this complex background, President Bush and President Putin will meet in Kennebunkport, a venue intended to allow the leaders to step back, consider how to avoid rhetorical escalation, and concentrate on a common agenda for efforts against common threats and to achieve shared goals.

Many ask why Russia has sharpened its rhetoric in the last few months. While Russia's impending electoral season may play a role, there may be deeper causes having to do with Russia's view of the world and its history over the past 16 years - that is, since the end of the Soviet Union.

Most people in the United States and Europe saw the end of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union as an extension of the self-liberation of Eastern Europe starting in 1989. In these countries, regained national sovereignty was accompanied by difficult, painful, but generally successful political and economic reforms. It was also associated with the emergence of democratic, free market systems that are fully part of the Euroatlantic community. We had hoped that Russia, liberated from communism and the imperative of empire, would follow the same pattern.

But the Russian government and official media, and to a significant extent Russian society, see the 1990s as a decade of domestic decline and chaos. Many have bitter personal memories of the hardships of the 1990s: the wiped-out savings; the increasing dysfunctionality of the state; the rise, especially after 1996, of massively corrupt and massively rich "oligarchs." Many Russians associate these problems with "democracy" and "reform" And see these domestic traumas through the external trauma of retreat. In Russia the perception exists that the collapse of the Soviet Bloc undid Russia's political gains in Europe in the twentieth century, and that the dissolution of the Soviet Union undid much of Russia's territorial expansion from the mid-seventeenth century.

In fact, the 1990s brought about a Europe whole, free and at peace, working with the United States in the wider world, with Russia welcome to play its part as a valued and respected partner. In the view of many Russians, however, the European order that emerged in the 1990s was imposed on a weak, vulnerable Russia. Many Russians cite NATO enlargement, the pro-Western orientation and aspirations of Georgia and to some extent Ukraine, and the unqualified and enthusiastic integration of the Baltics and even Central Europe into the Euroatlantic community, as an affront. They seem to hold the development of military relations between the United States and countries of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union as a painful reminder of a period of weakness. They view the support of the United States and EU for the Euroatlantic aspirations of former Soviet states with suspicion.

This order was, in the view of many Russians, unjust; a function of a latter day "Time of Troubles" to be challenged and to some extent rolled back. We are witnessing a backlash.

The 1990s, in this narrative, are a modern-day "Time of Troubles" for Russia: a period of weakness with antecedents to Russia's past. In Russian history, periods of disorder ended with the reemergence of strong rulers who restored Russian power. In this current case, President Vladimir Putin is often seen as a restorer of order and a state builder, and on the international stage, as a leader who has halted national retreat and sought to reverse it. Russians attribute to Putin a return to national pride.

The United States does not believe any nation has the right to impose a sphere of influence on unwilling countries. We do not miss the end of the Soviet bloc but celebrate the fact that Central and Eastern Europeans gained their freedom after 1989. We welcome the states of Eurasia into the family of nations that can choose their own destinies and associations. My purpose is not to justify, but to explain, the sources of Russian behavior.

President Putin's popularity appears to be a function of Russia's new wealth - spectacularly concentrated in a small class of super rich Russians but spreading beyond to a growing middle class. This rising wealth is generated in part by high world prices for energy. In fact, much of Russia's new confidence and assertiveness is underpinned by this new affluence. High prices for oil and natural gas are not just bankrolling the government. Because of the dependence of many surrounding states on Russian energy supplies provided by Russian state-owned companies, the new riches give Russia greater influence.

Russia's current political situation is also influenced by the lack of a free media or robust opposition that would critique and critically analyze the government's performance. Russian citizens who want a wider view must make an extra effort to find such opinions in the remnants of the free press and local electronic media or on the internet.

This is the context for Russia's relations with the United States, some of its neighbors, and Europe. We do not share many elements of the Russian view of recent history, but it is important to understand the Russian mindset, which may account for some of the current rhetoric coming from Moscow.

President Bush and the Administration have avoided a rhetorical race to the bottom as we approach our relationship with Russia. We have sought to address problems in a constructive spirit wherever possible while at the same time - and this is important - remaining firm in defense of our principles and friends. Strategically, the Administration seeks to protect and advance the new freedoms that have emerged in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and to do so in parallel with the development of a partnership with Russia.

We want to address problems around the world where we have common interests. Indeed, much of Russia's recent rhetoric about the United States is harsher than the reality of our cooperation. In our efforts, both to develop partnership with Russia and deal with challenges from Russia, we are working with our European allies. Given the Russian mood that I have described, this will take time and strategic patience in the face of problems and pressure. It will require steadiness on our part and that of our European Allies, and steadfast adherence to fundamental principles.

Nevertheless, the historical forces that I have laid out have had a deep impact on Russia's relations with the world.

They may explain, for example, why the Russians have alleged that U.S. plans to establish rotational training facilities in Romania and Bulgaria are a potential threat to Russia and constitute permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. They charge that these plans thus violate political commitments made in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in 1997.

Neither is true, of course. Our plans do not involve substantial combat forces, nor would U.S. forces be permanently stationed in those countries. Our plans are for periodic rotational training deployments of one brigade combat team. This is no threat to Russia, which has the largest conventional military forces on the continent, nor is it intended to be. Training and temporary movement of brigade-size units to Bulgaria and Romania can hardly threaten Russia.

Last April 26, the day of a NATO Foreign Ministers and NATO-Russia Council meeting in Oslo, President Putin suggested he would consider suspending Russia's implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) if no progress were made on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO Allies.

This declaration triggered immediate concern that Russia intended to weaken or even end this highly successful multilateral arms control regime. At the NATO foreign ministers meeting, and last week at the Extraordinary Conference on CFE in Vienna, which I attended as head of delegation, the United States and its allies made the point that we regard the CFE regime as the cornerstone of European security; that we welcome the opportunity to address Russia's concerns about the Treaty; and that we are eager to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. We also made clear, however, that we looked for Russia to fulfill the commitments it made when we signed the Adapted CFE in 1999 in Istanbul, including the withdrawal of Russian forces that are in Georgia and Moldova without those governments' consent.

The United States and our allies are prepared to be creative in helping Russia meet its Istanbul commitments and open to addressing Russia's concerns about the Adapted CFE Treaty. We hope that Russia will work with us, and not simply make ultimatums and withdraw from the Treaty, damaging European security to no good end.

For many weeks, Russia chose to react with skepticism verging on hostility to plans by the United States to place elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This modest system is intended to protect the United States and its European allies against missile threats from the Middle East. We have sought to address Russian concerns through more than 18 months of consultations, seeking to assure Russia that this system cannot possibly damage their own nuclear force.

We have also sought Russian cooperation on missile defense for many years and last April proposed a comprehensive package of suggestions for cooperation across the full spectrum of missile defense activities.

At the G8 Summit two weeks ago in Germany, President Putin put forth his own ideas for missile defense cooperation. Meeting with President Bush, President Putin proposed that the "Gabala" Russian-operated radar in Azerbaijan be used jointly for missile defense purposes. The proposal acknowledged the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran and the need to protect Europe, Russia and the United States from such a threat.

We look forward to discussing with Russia all ideas for missile defense cooperation. Europe, the United States, and Russia face a common threat and should seek common solutions. Of course, any U.S.-Russia discussions regarding the use of the existing Azerbaijani radar for missile defense purposes would be done in full consultation and cooperation with the government of Azerbaijan.

Finding a solution for the status of Kosovo constitutes one of the most acute problems in Europe today, and one in which Russia's position will make a critical difference. The stakes are high. Resolution of Kosovo's status is the final unresolved problem of the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Eight years after NATO forces drove out the predatory armies of the nationalist Milosevic regime, a UN Envoy for Kosovo Status, former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, has concluded that the only solution is Kosovo's independence, supervised by the international community, and with detailed guarantees, enforceable and specific, to protect Kosovo's Serbian community. The comprehensive plan developed by President Ahtisaari has the full support of the United States and Europe.

We now seek a UN Security Council Resolution to bring into force Ahtisaari's Plan and pave the way for Kosovo's supervised independence. Russia played an important and constructive role in framing the Ahtisaari Plan, which in fact meets Russia's concerns about protection of Kosovo's Serbian community and Serbian Orthodox religious sites. We are eager to find a solution at the Security Council that Russia can support. But further delay and endless negotiations will not solve the problem. And we must solve it, because the status quo is not stable. U.S. and European troops under NATO are keeping the peace but must not be put into an impossible position.

So far, Russia continues to reject any solution that is not approved by Serbia, even the creative compromise suggested by French President Nicholas Sarkozy at the G8; and Serbia has made clear that it will never agree to Kosovo's independence. Moreover, Russia suggests that a Kosovo solution involving independence will constitute a precedent leading to the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, as well as drive separatist movements elsewhere around the globe.

We believe that such a position is destabilizing and reckless. Kosovo is a unique situation because of the specific circumstances of Yugoslavia's overall violent and non-consensual breakup, the existence of state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, the threat of a massive humanitarian crisis bringing about NATO intervention to prevent it, and subsequent UN governance of Kosovo under a Security Council resolution that explicitly called for further decisions on Kosovo's final status. It constitutes no precedent for any other regional conflict anywhere in the world.

We will move forward. As President Bush said in Tirana on June 10, "I'm a strong supporter of the Ahtisaari plan…[T]he time is now. ... [W]e need to get moving; and . . . the end result is independence."

Delay or stalemate will likely lead to violence. Russia can yet play a helpful role.

Let me be clear. There is no linkage or similarity between Kosovo and Georgia's breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region. That said, we want to work with Russia to help resolve these conflicts peacefully. Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, have shown tentative signs of improvement, but we hope that Moscow does more to normalize relations. Russia should end the economic and transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia last fall.

For its part, Georgia needs to continue to avoid provocative rhetoric and to pursue exclusively peaceful and diplomatic means of resolving the separatist conflicts, as indeed it has for some time now. Moscow should recognize that a stable, prospering Georgia is surely a better neighbor than the alternative.

We do not believe that Georgia's Euroatlantic aspirations, or Ukraine's, need drive these countries from Moscow; we do not believe in a zero-sum approach or that these countries must chose between good relations with Moscow and the Euroatlantic community.

Russia's energy resources, and its position as transit country for the energy resources of Central Asian states, constitute a source of national wealth and a potential source of political power and leverage for Russia in its region. We have seen this demonstrated in the case of Ukraine in 2006. Russia also faces growing domestic demand for energy and thus needs massive investment and technology even to maintain current production levels. At the same time, and somewhat inconsistently, Moscow seems to want to circumscribe foreign presence in its energy sector and maintain its near-monopoly over Central Asian energy exports to Europe. Thus, Russia's energy policy sends mixed signals to its foreign partners as Moscow seeks to balance these competing demands.

For our part, we seek an open and cooperative energy relationship with Moscow and have sought to use our bilateral energy dialogue, launched with high hopes in 2003, to this end. We have enjoyed some successes, such as the ConocoPhillips-Lukoil deal, the success of ExxonMobil in Sakhalin-1 in Russia's Far East, and the continued presence of U.S. energy services companies in Western Siberia and the Volga-Urals. But recent state pressure on foreign energy investors has limited the scope for cooperation.

The Caspian region is ripe for further energy development. The key question is what form this will take. Russia will be a major player in Central Asia's energy sector under any scenario. We believe that Central Asian countries would be wise to court more than one customer and more than one source for energy transport. The U.S. government does not support monopolies or cartels. We believe in competitive markets for energy and transport of oil and gas. America's Eurasian energy security policy promotes diversification, and that includes efforts to advance reliable, long-term flows of natural gas from the Caspian region to European markets.

Last month, the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan issued a declaration pledging to cooperate on increasing natural gas exports from Central Asia to Russia. This declaration attracted attention and misplaced speculation in the press. But in reality, the three Presidents' statement need have no direct impact on U.S. government effort to develop multiple gas pipeline routes from the Caspian Sea region to Europe.

We continue to convey the message that despite continued strong economic growth, Russia must look to the long-term and attract investment into its energy sector. Greater U.S. investment in this sector would serve the interests of both countries: American companies have the capital and high technology Russia needs to exploit many of its oil and gas fields.

Although the investment climate has improved on some fronts, investment in Russia - in energy and other areas - presents a mixed picture. Many American companies are doing well in Russia and we wish them success. The best way to sustain Russia's development is through judicial reform to strengthen rule of law, banking reform to improve the capacity of the financial sector, accounting reform to promote greater transparency and integration into international business standards, improved corporate governance, and reduction of government bureaucracy.

Following the bilateral market access agreement we signed last November, the United States strongly supports Russia's WTO accession. Russia is the largest economy remaining outside of the WTO, and there is still a considerable multilateral process to complete, but we believe it is important for Russia to become more integrated into the world economy.

As we continue to work with Russia in the multilateral process, we are focusing on some key outstanding concerns, particularly on intellectual property rights (IPR), market access for beef, and barriers to trade in agricultural products (SPS issues). Russia will need to resolve all outstanding bilateral and multilateral issues before it accedes to the WTO. We hope this process, and also prompt graduation of Russia from Jackson-Vanik restrictions, can be completed.

The complexities of Russia's relations with its neighbors, with Europe and with the United States reflect broader, negative trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. As President Bush said in his recent speech in Prague, "In Russia, reforms that were once promised to empower citizens have been derailed, with troubling implications for democratic development."

Curtailment of the right to protest, constriction of the space of civil society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious setbacks inconsistent with Russia's professed commitment to building and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. And these setbacks ultimately weaken any nation as well as the partnership we would like to have with Russia.

The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is especially troubling. Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom are essential in all democracies. In Russia today, unfortunately, most national television networks are in government hands or the hands of individuals and entities allied with the Kremlin. Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, chill and deter the fourth estate.

Also deeply troubling, the Kremlin is bringing its full weight to bear in shaping the legal and social environment to preclude a level playing field in the upcoming elections. There have been many instances in which the authorities have used electoral laws selectively to the advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring opposition forces.

The ban on domestic nonpartisan monitors also seems to have been based on political criteria. The challenges to rights of expression, assembly and association also run counter to a commitment to free and fair democratic elections. Last year, the Duma enacted amendments to the criminal and administrative codes redefining "extremism" so broadly and vaguely as to provide a potent weapon to wield against and intimidate opponents. Greater self-censorship appears to be a major consequence in this effort.

Against this background, the United States and its European Allies and friends continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. We speak out and reach out to civil society and the opposition, and will continue to do so. We also maintain an open dialogue with the Russian government on these issues. We are not, charges to the contrary, seeking to interfere in Russia's domestic political affairs. Such charges of outside interference are as misplaced as they are anachronistic.

We will, however, always stand for the advance of freedom and democracy. Russia's development of democratic institutions is not of marginal interest to us. America along with the rest of the international community, including Russia, some time ago abandoned the notion that the internal character of nations was none of our business. As the President said at the recent Prague summit on freedom and democracy, attended by representatives of Russia's democratic forces, expanding freedom is more than a moral imperative - it is the only realistic way to protect free people in the long run. The President recalled Andrei Sakharov's warning that a country that does not respect the rights of its own people will not respect the rights of its neighbors.

The United States and the Euroatlantic community must accept that we will work with, and live with, a much more assertive Russia for some time to come. We welcome a strong Russia; a weak, chaotic, nervous Russia is not a partner we can work with or count on. But we want to see Russia become strong in twenty-first century and not nineteenth century terms.

Some stabilization after the 1990s was inevitable and positive. But a modern nation needs more than a strong center. It needs strong democratic institutions: independent regulatory bodies, independent and strong judicial organs, independent media and civil society groups. In this century, strength means strong independent institutions, such as the judiciary, the media and NGOs, not just a strong center. And it means political parties that grow from and represent and reflect the interests of the entire citizenry, not merely those of a government bureaucracy or a small number of oligarchs. Russia's modernization may yet produce a property owning class that will come to demand a different relationship with the state than Russians have traditionally known.

In its foreign policy, a truly strong and confident nation has productive and respectful relations with sovereign, independent neighbors. Strength in this century means avoiding zero-sum thinking. It means especially avoiding thinking of the West in general and U.S. in particular as an adversary or independent neighbors as a threat. And we must avoid thinking of Russia as an adversary, even as we deal with serious differences.

We must also remember the many areas where we continue to cooperate well with Russia. One of these is counter terrorism, where, sadly, the U.S. and Russia have been victims and where we enjoy strong cooperation. The U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group met last fall and will meet again in a few months. Its mission is to continue and deepen cooperation on intelligence, law enforcement, WMD, terrorist financing, counternarcotics, Afghanistan, UN issues, MANPADS, and transportation security. Under our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, we also work closely on transnational crime, which covers terrorism, but also addresses drug-trafficking and organized crime, human-trafficking and child exploitation, internet fraud, and violent crime.

Last year, the United States and Russia worked together to create the Global Initiative on Nuclear Terrorism. In the span of a year, over fifty countries have joined the Global Initiative, which fosters cooperation and improves the abilities of partner nations to counter various aspects of nuclear terrorism. In that year, the U.S. and Russia have continued to work hand in hand on expanding the Initiative's scope and depth in what serves as a real example of bilateral cooperation.

Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year we renewed until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which facilitates dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.

We cooperate well on nuclear nonproliferation, both common global nonproliferation goals, and specifically to contain the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Although Moscow has sometimes voiced disagreement with our approach to sanctions and other measures, Russia voted for UN Security Council Resolutions that impose sanctions on North Korea and Iran. The United States and Russia also participate productively in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and we and Russia are cooperating well on complex banking issues having to do with North Korea.

We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council, the NRC. We have a broad menu of cooperative NRC initiatives involving diverse experts on both sides, including Russian participation in Operation Active Endeavor and counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The Russian Duma's ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with NATO opens up greater opportunities for cooperation.

Despite the differences, then, cooperation between the United States and Russia is broad, substantive, and includes cooperation on critical, strategic areas.

Our areas of difference are also significant.

We face a complex period in relations with Russia, as I have said. The past months have been especially difficult and the issues that we face, Kosovo especially, may strain our relations.

In this context, we must remain steady. We cannot give way to lurches of exaggerated hopes followed by exaggerated disappointment.

The strategic response to the challenges presented by the Russia of today means defending our interests while building on areas of common concern, as we have done. It means finding the right balance between realism about Russia and the higher realism of commitment to defend and advance our values. It means offering the hand of cooperation and taking the high road wherever possible, but standing up for what we believe is right and in all cases working with our Allies.

The last three American Presidents have sought in various ways to find this balance. All faced the fact that relations with Russia cannot be resolved on a timetable or according to an agenda that we prefer. But since 1989 we have seen a Cold War end, an empire dissolved, and the beginnings of partnership take root.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I hope we can take lessons from our successes as well as learn our lessons about continuing challenges

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