Missile Defense and Europe VIDEO, PODCAST

Missile Defense and Europe, Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering, Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency; FULL STREAMING VIDEO, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC. March 28, 2007, 11:15 A.M. EST. PODCAST OF THIS ARTICLE

MODERATOR: Good morning, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center for another briefing on the U.S. missile defense plans in Europe with our European allies. Again, we're happy to welcome back Ambassador Dan Fried and Lieutenant General Obering, who have both been on -- had extensive consultations in Europe. So they will open with some remarks and then be happy to take your questions.

Ambassador Fried.

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Hello, everyone. Good to be back here in what I don't doubt will be a continuing series of discussions about missile defense and the politics and debate surrounding missile defense. I've been -- I was in Europe last week in Warsaw, Copenhagen and The Hague. Missile defense was a common theme in all three stops and I wanted to mention this and discussion my views and answer your questions about the way the debate is shaping up.

And I want to start out by saying that there needs to be a discussion of missile defense and the strategic problem and challenge that missile defense in its current iteration is designed to address. But I want to stress from the start that this debate needs to be grounded in the reality of the threat, the potential threat, and the reality of the strategic context that we all face, the "we" in this case being the transatlantic community and the "we" in this case also being Russia because it faces the same threats that we do or similar threats.

The debate should not be, in my view, about issues of 20 years ago and issues of a so-called arms race, and in this context I was struck that today, today in Berlin as a matter of fact, the Americans and Russians are sitting down to discuss post-START issues and transparency issues for the post-START regime after the START Treaty expires. I mention this because the transparency and confidence-building measures which we're going to be discussing are a part and an illustrative part of the developing good strategic relationship between the United States and Russia as we address the new world that we face together.

It is also true that the Treaty of Moscow, which reduced arms, reduced warheads on both sides, is being implemented. To remind you, it calls for massive reductions in warheads on both sides, down to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. The United States is on target to meet reductions. Russia is well on target to meet reductions.

So the notion that somehow missile defense has to be seen as part of an emerging arms race between the United States and Russia, which is some of the odd commentary I hear from some Europeans, has no relationship to reality and the debate about missile defense ought to be conducted in a way, it seems to me, that reflects reality.

Second point is that NATO has, in fact, addressed missile defense issues, and read paragraph 25 of the Riga summit declaration, which refers to a threat, a threat to which missile defenses can provide an answer. The NATO study that the summit declaration refers to was a study of short- and mid-range missile defense systems. In theory, it's determined that the systems have the theoretical possibility of being effective. NATO has called for more work on this.

In our view, the more NATO is involved in this, the better. And the bilateral systems which the United States is preparing to discuss with the Poles and the Czechs could be -- and in fact we would all benefit if they were -- integrated with national systems and linked up with some sort of NATO-integrated system. It's early to discuss specifics. I'm not announcing anything. But in terms of our -- the general American view of the way ahead, it certainly includes a role for NATO.

I would also add that we look forward, we look forward to discussions with our Russian friends about missile defense issues, both to ease their concerns -- of course, we've had multiple high-level discussions with the Russians before, but if we have to keep explaining this, we are happy to do so; and to the degree to which the Russians are ready, I certainly think that cooperation with Russia is something we would be interested in.

So I found the European debate to be a mixture of genuine interest in this new strategic challenge that Iran poses, genuine interest in discussing how missile defenses can play a stabilizing role, how missile defense will avoid a situation in which Europe and the United States enjoy different levels of security. In fact, the NATO area should have the same level of security, in the American view.

But laced in with this were some concerns which I felt unfounded, so I've tried to address these here today.

It is also true that politics may play a part in this, which is always -- which is both inevitable dealing with democracies, but it's the job of officials such as myself to try to bring the discussion back to the actual issues, not to the politics and meta-issues which can cloud more than they obscure.

I found specifically that the Poles, Danes, Dutch had different kinds of questions. The Poles were obviously interested in the bilateral relationship with the United States. They expressed concerns about any additional insecurities or pressures from the Russians. They want to deepen their cooperation with the United States, but they want to -- the Polish Government is quite clearly going to negotiate based on its own national interests, and I expect they will negotiate strongly, as is the Polish habit.

The Danes and the Dutch were interested in the larger strategic issues and I found my conversations there to be actually quite hopeful because we were getting into the issues of reality, not the issues of the meta-reality that so often characterized the European -- some of the European debate.

I will be happy to answer any questions about this. I gather that running on the wires now is a reference to a phone call between Presidents Putin and Bush in which missile defense came up. I heard that from Reuters, and as far as I know, that is an accurate account. But I think the way forward lies through continued consultations with the Russians. We've had a long track record of consultations with them on this issue. We intend to continue those. And I look forward both to answering your questions and to working with European governments.

Now my colleague and collaborate, General Obering, is welcome to say a few things, and then we'll both happily take your questions.

LTG OBERING: Thank you very much, Ambassador Fried. Well, good morning. I want to also provide a little context for some questions that may be generated as a result of our meeting this morning, also bring you up to speed a little bit on my activities since I last addressed you in February.

First of all, a little bit of the context. Again, for the last two and a half years, the United States has been fielding a system that has been aimed toward defending the United States, our deployed forces, our allies and friends, against what we see to be threats that are emerging from North Korea as well as Iran. We initially turned our attention to North Korea because we felt that that had the highest sense of urgency and we believe that that was somewhat justified by the activities last summer.

We have since begun to turn our attention to Iran as well. Modifying radar in United Kingdom is one of the first steps of that and then being able to provide and extend this coverage to our allies and our deployed forces in the European theater against an emerging Iranian threat is clearly what we are geared toward.

We have had very good success in the past two and a half years with respect to testing of this system. We have come a long, long way from the failure-ridden program back in the '90s and we've built a lot on the investments in the technologies since then. In fact, we have now had 24 successful hit-to-kill intercepts in about 32 attempts since 2001, and that includes though that we've had successes in the last 14 to 15 flight tests over the past two, two and a half years. So this program works. It is a capability that does work and that we will rely on as we move into this 21st century.

Just a couple of quick points on the elements that we're talking about, of course, are being able to provide up to ten interceptors in a site in Poland, to provide a midcourse radar in the Czech Republic and a transportable radar that we would locate later on because it's very -- it's highly transportable and easily fielded.

I want to remind everybody that these are defensive assets. These are not offensive missiles. They do not even carry warheads. There are no explosives on these missiles. We operate on, as I said, a hit-to-kill technology, which is we actually drive a very small kill vehicle into an enemy warhead to destroy it. And the reason it is so effective is because the speeds that we do this at are so great it basically destroys the warhead from a kinetic energy perspective. In fact, the kill vehicles that we're talking about that would be placed on the interceptors in Poland are no more than about 70 to 75 kilograms. They're very small and they operate, as I said, on the hit-to-kill technology.

I have personally traveled to brief the NATO-Russia Council since I last met with you. I also traveled to Berlin, met with the Germans; to Paris, met with the French; and to Kiev with the Ukrainians. We've also had discussions with delegations from the Czechs and the Poles here and we have folks that are there this week that are going through discussions with those countries as well.

We have plans to visit, in the coming weeks, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Hungary, and then going back to the NATO-Russia Council for further discussions at a more technical expert level. Now, in those discussions there's a theme that I picked up that I just want to emphasize and I think it's very, very important. In fact, I think it's one of the most important themes that we can concentrate on. And I get asked -- well, first of all, doesn't this upset the balance that we've achieved in the past between deterrence and what about arms control? Doesn't this contradict arms control measures?

And what I want to put this in the context of is that is -- missile defense is part of a spectrum. It's part of an entire toolbox that we try to use to address the ballistic missile threat. At one end of that spectrum, of course, you have deterrence and we believe that that is still a very viable concept and we've relied on that from the United States' perspective for many years. And we believe we will continue to rely on that deterrent factor for those nations and those organizations that can be deterred.

There are other nations and organizations in which arms control measures are very effective, both positive and negative aspects of that and we believe very strongly in that. And we also believe, though, that we may come into contact with nation states or non-state actors that are deterrable, that are not affected by arms control measures. And when you have warheads flying in the air, it is a moral obligation to do something about that for the population, not just turning around and just saying, sorry, we can't do anything about that.

So we believe missile defense fits into a spectrum that includes deterrence and arms control measures. And the other reason why we believe it's so important, and this is what I think it's fundamental, the reason that we've had a proliferation of ballistic missiles around the world for these past many years is because they are highly valued. Why are they highly valued? Well, historically, because there has been no deployed defense capability against these weapons. Well, if you begin to deploy defensive capabilities to where you can negate these missiles, it begins to devalue them. And so we believe that it will begin to have a tremendous effect on the proliferation of these missiles because they will lose their value to the nation or to the organizations because we believe we can render them ineffective.

And so that puts hopefully some of the -- some of what we're doing in context and I'll be happy to answer any questions that you may have along with the Ambassador.

MODERATOR: If you would state your name and organization, please wait for the mike when you have a question.

Yes, sir. Just wait for the mike.

QUESTION: Okay. Jedrzej Bielecki from Rzeczpospolita Polish daily. First of all, if you could elaborate about the discussion today between President Bush and President Putin, what was the message of the American leader?

And secondly, on Monday Congress adopted a resolution concerning the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. Don't you think that this could be -- could make you more difficult to convince Russians about the good intentions of the United States? And what is the position of the Administration on this? I mean, do you want really to -- did you take -- took any decision on the Georgian issue -- inviting Georgia to NATO?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Well, I have nothing further about the discussion between the two presidents. You can check with the White House about that, but I really don't have anything more.

With respect to NATO membership, I'm curious to take a question from a Polish newspaper about the allegedly destabilizing effects of NATO expansion on Russia. I thought we were pretty much past that particular debate. I've always thought that NATO enlargement was immensely stabilizing. Can you imagine a Europe today with 100 million Europeans between Germany and Russia that were kept out of Europe's chief security and integrative institutions? That would indeed be destabilizing. We believe that NATO enlargement is a good thing because it extends security and stability to countries which could use it. It doesn't threaten anyone. The notion that NATO poses a threat to Russia is simply wrong.

But with respect to Georgia and Ukraine, no, our country has not made a decision about whether they should be offered NATO membership. In the case of Ukraine, Ukraine itself has not decided whether it seeks NATO membership. As declaratory government policy that's one thing, and the Ukrainian Government is itself divided, but the Ukrainian public is very much divided. So the first thing we look for is for a Ukrainian national consensus.

In Georgia there is a consensus. They do want NATO membership. We welcome the progress in their reforms -- their peaceful deepening of their democratic institutions, of constructive resolution of some of their regional conflicts. And let's take this a step at a time. Too early to make that decision, but we welcome Georgia's forward progress.

Again, NATO is -- no matter how many times the charge is made otherwise, it remains a false charge that NATO is an aggressive or anti-Russian organization. It is an organization that extends security and stability, and an organization which is working to help the Afghan people, which is working to promote stability in Kosovo. This is an organization that Russia -- that we hope Russia will learn to work with even more in the future.

QUESTION: Mario Bardazzi, ANSA Italian News Agency ANSA. A question for General Obering. Yesterday in a hearing in Congress, you said that you already have some NATO countries that are sharing technologies with you and you mentioned an agreement with Italy on technology sharing. Could you elaborate on this? And can you tell us if Italy and other southern European countries will be full covered by the system?

LTG OBERING: Sure. We have recently signed a -- what we call a framework agreement with the Italian Government that basically outlines some of the mechanisms and processes by which we will collaborate on missile defense. So we're at just at the beginning of that. This framework agreement basically outlines the general way that we will approach the agreements and the projects, and then we list projects underneath that agreement that we decide to pursue. And I won't be any more specific on the projects because that's just beginning in that process, but it was a major milestone that we were able to sign that agreement with Italy.

They joined, by the way, other nations like United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, Japan and others that have signed an agreement with us. We also have, by the way, relations and ongoing discussions with a whole variety of countries around the world with respect to missile defense. It is becoming more and more of a concern.

With respect to coverage, the nation of Italy is covered. In fact, all of the nations that would be threatened by a long-range missile or what we call a higher-end intermediate-range missile, the system covers those countries. The countries that are very close in to an Iranian threat, such as Turkey, for example, portions of Greece, they would not be threatened by the long-range missiles. They would be threatened by the shorter-range missiles and you have other defenses that can be brought into play to address that.

In fact, that's one of the areas that we believe is very much within a NATO context because NATO has stood up a active layered (ph) theater missile defense program office that is managed by a French -- has a French program manager and an American deputy program manager. That office is concentrating on the shorter-range missile defense capabilities that could be brought to bear within NATO. We believe that that would fit a -- that'd be a nice dovetail, so to speak, to the longer-range umbrella that could be provided between the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic. So we believe that this fits very nicely into that NATO type of context.

MODERATOR: Yeah, right here.

QUESTION: I'm Katja Gloger, Stern Magazine from Germany. Ambassador Fried, good morning. You just said that missile defense could play a stabilizing role in the relations also to Europe. At least for Germany and at least for the time being, the opposite is true. Our magazine will publish a poll tomorrow where Germans have been asked about the threat for world peace. 48 percent of Germans believe that the United States is a bigger threat to world security than Iran and 72 percent are against missile defense. So how will you convince Europeans and especially Germans that your position is the right one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED: Well, I'm aware of the polls. I wonder how comfortable Germany would be in a bilateral security relationship with Iran, okay? So I don't entirely take -- I don't even think that many people who say that really mean it. They're saying something else, but this is not for me to say what they think. The -- I understand the politics in Germany about this issue are -- is, to my mind, somewhat exotic. It reminds me of the debate in the 1980s about the Pershings. At a time when the Soviet Union was run by Leonid Brezhnev, Germany was divided, Berlin was divided, this was a nasty period in the Cold War and yet, hundreds of thousands of Germans regularly demonstrated against the American military presence.

The way the Cold War ended, I thought, was pretty good. It ended peacefully, it ended with your country united. I don't think, therefore, we need to look back with great anxiety over how we worked together in those years, nor do I think that the debates and the political slogans of that period need to be readapted currently.

When I said missile defense could be stabilizing, I meant in a strategic context and I think General Obering explained it. I think it would be profoundly destabilizing, for example, if we were to find in 15 years that Iran had a handful, a dozen or so ballistic missiles capable of striking Europe and nuclear warheads to put on top of them. Imagine that kind of a situation where Europe was completely vulnerable to these weapons, put yourselves in the position of Germany if there were a crisis in the Middle East. Threats to Israel; is that really the position that would serve Germany security or European security if there were a well-developed, limited, and very modest missile defense system in Germany? It would be profoundly stabilizing because there would no longer be the sense of imminent and massive vulnerability. That's what I meant.

LTG OBERING: Could I add something to that, please? Polls are important to understand public attitudes, but they're not everything and they change very rapidly. In fact, I think if you went back and took a look in this country before September 11th, you wouldn't find a large percentage of the population that would even recognize a threat from a terrorist group like al-Qaida. Of course, that changed overnight. You can also see what happened here last summer when we were inundated in the Missile Defense Agency with dozens and dozens and dozens of phone calls from the media, both broadcast and press, about what can you do about these North Korean missiles.

And in a case of missiles, you can't affect the defense overnight. It's not something you can turn the way public opinion can turn overnight. You can't do that overnight. It takes time to build these defenses. So what may be true today with respect to popular opinion or support can change very dramatically and rapidly tomorrow as world scenes unfold. So what is responsible for -- or responsible leaders is to try to understand that direction and try to do something about it before you try to connect the dots after the fact.

MODERATOR: Yeah, we have a question from New York. If you would go ahead, please, and ask the question.

QUESTION: Hi. I'm Adrian Novac from Antena T.V. Channel One. And my question is a follow-up. Lately there were a lot of reports in Romania media that shields (ph) will not cover Romania. And my question is: How do you respond to these concerns? And also are you afraid that there will be a division among NATO members because of this problem?

Thank you so much.

LTG OBERING: Well, as I stated, for those countries that would be threatened from a long range weapon they are covered. So countries that are inside of what we would consider to be the range for the longer range weapons, they would be covered against the shorter range threats with protection that could be generated from NATO. We have capabilities today within the U.S. military with our Patriot system, with our sea-based interceptors that could provide that coverage. And we have a capability that will be coming out in the next two years or so, which is our Terminal High Altitude Area Defense weapon which is a very highly mobile land-based system as well. So there are systems to be able to cover that.

I think what's important is for NATO to decide how they're going to approach that. Like I said, they've stood up a program to do that. They need to come to grips with that and then we need to make sure we can marry that together with the long range capabilities.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED: Let me add something there. The question also addressed a principle that General Obering and I have been talking about, which is that there should not be two levels or multiple levels of security within the transatlantic community and the NATO alliance. There should be one level of security and it is not right that some countries be vulnerable while other countries are covered. So what General Obering was saying is that we -- there are multiple ways to cover countries, but there is a single principle that we need to respect which is that there should not be in the end multiple levels of security. There should not be class A and class B allies. And it does the United States, frankly, little good if we are secured from ballistic missile attack but our European allies are completely vulnerable. That also is a strategic problem for us.

MODERATOR: Yes, in the back.

QUESTION: Alexander Panov, Russian Television International. And my question is a very (sic) question. Why not invite Russia to participate in this program? You said you are ready for cooperation. For example, if Poland and Czech Republic have something against Russian militaries participate in this program on their territory, why not to find some common base in Azerbaijan, for example, or -- well, why not to make invitation and the problem with Russia will be solved? Or this propaganda war will be -- on your side you will win in this case? Very naïve question, sorry for this.

LTG OBERING: No, it's a very straightforward question and it's one that we are very interested in answering, which is yes. We are very open to Russian participation and invitation into collaboration on missile defense in the broader sense and on any level, all the way down to specifics in terms of potentially sharing data and radar data information. We will be collecting data from the radars that I talked about. The Russians have radars as well that could be very useful to the defense of Russia, obviously, and the European theater. We would love to share that data and collaborate in that. And hopefully what this will do is it will spark those discussions that have stalled in the past with respect to Russian collaboration so that we can actually welcome them as a full partner in this collaboration as we go forward.

MODERATOR: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Marcin Gadzinski, Gazeta Poland. A question for Secretary Fried, a NATO question, you said more NATO involvement the better, so what is the difference of opinion? Could you specify what you want to do and Germans and other NATO members don't want to do and what they want to do and you don't want? Could you specific more on that? What is the difference of opinion?

Also if I may, a question for General Obering, do you have a specific location in Poland that you have selected and could you name it? Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED: We all agree that NATO should discuss matters of common NATO security. We all agree that missile defense is an area that ought to be discussed. There is agreement at NATO that short and mid-range theater systems should be discussed and there is, as General Obering said, a NATO program office helping develop these systems. Where there needs to be more discussion is how the programs that may come into existence between the United States, Czech Republic and Poland can be fit into an all NATO system, what kind of integration and, of course, how possible collaboration with Russia would work. So these things could be -- need to be fit together and there needs to be a discussion.

But at the official level there is far more understanding, far more commonality of views than you would ever dream from reading some of the European press.

LTG OBERING: If I could -- feedback on that and then I'll answer your other question. We believe that there is a growing recognition within NATO of the threat as Ambassador Fried stated. That came out of recent communiqués. But even in our ongoing discussions with our NATO partners, both in the NATO context as well as bilaterally, we see a growing alarm over what is happening in Iran and that is being shared by the NATO partners.

To your specific question about location, we actually looked at three different locations in Poland that were nominated by the government. We have visited those sites. We will continue that evaluation. But no, we haven't specified a site. There's a preferred site but that would be up to the government of Poland to be able to announce that.

MODERATOR: Yeah, right here, the mike's coming.

QUESTION: Thanks. Tomas Zalewski Polish Press Agency. Sorry to be so repetitive, because we keep asking these questions again and again. But shouldn't the United States deploy these Patriot missiles in Poland and possibly Terminal High Altitude Defense system, as some people say, to better convince Poland that it's really in the interest in Poland and that we have some security -- additional security guarantees?

And secondly, has the chief negotiator been actually nominated after all? And when do negotiations start with Poland? Two questions, actually, or three.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED: Well, you've asked a couple of different questions buried in that. One of them is we have -- we should have with Poland a serious discussion of the additional threats, if any, that would have to be addressed if this facility were actually established. The Poles will want to have that discussion. That was clear from my talks in Warsaw. And we look forward to having it.

So we need to have a serious discussion of the threat and then the measures taken to counter that threat. There's also another question, which is what my friend and colleague Eric Edelman referred to today as ancillary benefits to Poland. Those were his words. he did some press earlier today in Berlin and I think he used that phrase. I don't know what they would be, but obviously, as our bilateral defense relationship with Poland deepens, we will be discussing a lot of thee issues.

The question though is how this benefits Polish national security. Poland will make a national decision. We will have some intensive discussions over quite a period of time to resolve these issues and share ideas, listen to Polish concerns. I look forward to those.

MODERATOR: We'll go to George (Geddes AP).

QUESTION: Also about these negotiations --

MODERATOR: One second.

QUESTION: Who the (inaudible) negotiations (inaudible) American (inaudible)?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: The American side?

QUESTION: Yes.

AMBASSADOR FRIED: I don't know. I don't know precisely when the negotiations will begin. We're waiting -- we're going to be talking with the Polish Government about that, and there will be -- you know, doubtless there will be a team of folks from the uniformed military, Defense Department policy side, State Department, but I don't have a name for you yet.

QUESTION: George Gedda, AP. Dan, you've mentioned two or three times the possible threat that the Poles could face, presumably from Russia. Won't the Czechs face the same threat level as the Poles? Isn't there a bit of parallelism here?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: Yes, and what I said with respect to Poland applies equally to the Czech Republic. I mentioned Poland because I was recently in Warsaw, had that much on my mind. And yes, of course the remarks of a Russian general a few weeks ago about attacking these countries if they dared develop these systems was, let us say, unfortunate, of course.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) This is question for General Obering. What difference does it make for you now that the Czech Government just today agreed to start a negotiation? Does that mean you can start some other screening of the sides, some measurement, or does it make any difference on a technical level?

LTG OBERING: First of all, it represents good progress in the discussions with the Czech Republic. It also means that we can expand some of the survey work that we're doing and make sure that we fully understand the environment and do more of what we call the technical site survey work that you just described. So that is a very good sign, a very positive sign. In fact, overall, I think we're getting positive signs from both Poland and the Czech Republic with respect to collaboration and moving ahead.

MODERATOR: One right here.

QUESTION: Jim Wolf, Reuters. I wondered if I could draw you out on how possible collaboration with Russia might work. Is there any prospect for extending missile defense against long-range threats to Russian territory?

LTG OBERING: There certainly is the ability, the technical ability, to do that and we would welcome those types of discussions with the Russians. There's also capabilities that the Russians themselves have that could be incorporated, I think, into a larger system, a larger capability. Those are the types of discussions that we would like to re-engage our Russian partners on and to determine how we could move ahead in this. And like I said, it could run everything, sharing the gamut from data and information exchange all the way to potentially the interaction of systems themselves and technology exchange. It just depends on how we can characterize this and how we can move it forward.

MODERATOR: Okay, we'll take one last one from New York. Thanks.

QUESTION: Hi. Ambassador Fried, I'm Mario Calabresi from La Republica, Italy. May I give you a question about NATO and Afghanistan in the context of the future cooperation of NATO? Because yesterday the Italian parliament approved the renewal of the mission in Afghanistan and I would like if you can give us a comment on that. And also your position (inaudible) by Mr. Berlusconi (inaudible), do you have any comment on that?

AMBASSADOR FRIED: We welcome the Italian parliament's decision to support its Afghanistan mission. We welcome the Italian participation and contribution to NATO's Afghan mission. I'm not going to comment on the debate except to say I'm glad it ended with an affirmative vote. And again, we very much appreciate what Italy is doing and we appreciate Italy's commitment to keep working in support of the Afghan people.

MODERATOR: Ambassador Fried, General Obering, thank you very much.

Technorati Tags: State Department and Secretary of State or Lieutenant General Henry Obering and Condoleezza Rice, or U.S. Missile Defense and U.S. State Department or NATO and Daniel Fried or European and Eurasian Affairs

United States Policy Toward Iran, VIDEO, PODCAST

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington, DC March 29, 2007. PODCAST OF THIS ARTICLE INTRODUCTION - Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished Members of the Committee.

I last appeared before this committee in September to discuss our strategy for addressing the challenges posed by Iran. At that time, Iran appeared to be riding high. The Iranian regime had spurned a historic offer to begin negotiations on its nuclear weapons ambitions with the U.S. and our P-5 partners. Instead, it proceeded openly and in unimpeded fashion in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. It was escalating its efforts to fund Hizballah and Hamas and sow discord in both Lebanon and Iraq. At home, the Iranian regime’s disastrous economic policies and radical rhetoric went largely unchallenged, except by the brave efforts of a small number of dissidents and activists.

Since that time, however, the United States – in concert with an ever-widening coalition of concerned states – has taken significant steps to check Iran’s nuclear ambitions, contain its regional trouble-making, and intensify Tehran’s isolation. We have coordinated a series of diplomatic initiatives with allies across the world to knock Iran off its stride, and I believe, put it on the defensive for the first time.

Just this past weekend, the U.S. led the Security Council in a 15-0 vote to condemn and sanction Iran for the second time in three months.

Despite the fulminations of President Ahmadi-Nejad, Iran is not impervious to financial and diplomatic pressure. It is clear to us that concerted international pressure is helping to undercut the Iranian regime’s sense of ascendancy, unnerve its overly confident leadership, and clarify to it the costs of its irresponsible behavior. Indeed, although the Iranian regime remains obstinate and we have not yet succeeded in either stopping altogether its nuclear research programs or blunting its support for terrorism, we are making progress. I believe that this active and focused diplomatic strategy is the best way forward for our country.

As you know, we face a complex, interconnected set of four crises in the Middle East: the need to achieve a stable and more peaceful Iraq; to strengthen the democratically elected government of Lebanon against Iran’s, Syria’s, and Hizballah’s attempt to unseat it; to block Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions; and to establish the foundations for peace between the Israeli and the Palestinian people. The Middle East is now the region of greatest importance for the U.S. worldwide, and our critical interests are engaged in all of these areas. But beyond our responsibility to help stabilize Iraq, nothing is more vital to the future of America’s role in the Middle East than addressing the challenges posed by the radical regime in Iran, whose public face is the vitriolic President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.

For nearly three decades, dealing with Tehran’s confrontational ideology and strident anti-Americanism has been a persistent dilemma for our country. But never have the concerns regarding Iran’s intentions been more serious, the intricacies of Iranian politics more significant, or the policy imperatives more urgent than they are today. Under President Ahmad-Nejad, Tehran has embarked on a dangerous course—repeatedly defying its obligations under international law and appalling the world with the most abhorrent, irresponsible rhetoric from a world leader in many years. Ahmadi-Nejad has declared that Iran’s nuclear program has “no brakes,” and the Iranian regime has brazenly disregarded demands from both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council for a full suspension of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. We have created a coalition of all the leading countries of the world who are concerned that Iran’s so-called peaceful nuclear program is actually designed to produce a nuclear weapon.

Beyond its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iran has endeavored to sow chaos and instability throughout the region, particularly in the precarious democracies of Iraq and Lebanon, where Iranian-funded militants seek to thwart the democratic will of the Iraqi and Lebanese people. And as the regime has escalated its long-standing and violent rejection of a Middle East peace settlement between the Israeli and the Palestinian people, its human rights record at home has once again taken a dismal turn.

In order to deal with the challenge that Iran poses, we have a policy of applying multiple points of pressure against the Iranian regime. First, we are working at the United Nations and bilaterally to increase pressure on Iran to abandon its apparent quest for a nuclear weapons capability. As a result, there is now a major international coalition of countries asking Iran to abandon a nuclear weapons capability. This coalition includes all of Europe, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Egypt, and now Indonesia and South Africa. Second, we have applied U.S. financial sanctions on Iran’s leading banks. Third, we have used our influence to convince leading European banks to stop all lending to Iran. We have convinced European governments and Japan to begin reducing export credits. Fourth, we continue our efforts to discourage the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism and extremism, while expanding engagement with the Iranian people. Finally, we have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the region that it remains an area of vital importance to us and we have taken steps to counter the destructive activities of Iran in Iraq itself. All of these points of pressure have had an impact on Iran, which is now essentially without friends on the nuclear issue.

Diplomacy is our best and preferred course of action in blocking and containing the Iranian regime. I do not believe a military confrontation with Iran is either desirable or inevitable. If we continue our skillful diplomatic course and have the patience to see it play out over the mid- to long-term, I am confident we can avoid conflict and see our strategy succeed. Our strong hope is that Iran will accept the offer to negotiate with the U.S. and our P-5 partners so that we can achieve a peaceful end to Tehran’s apparent nuclear weapons ambitions.

Any effective diplomatic strategy must provide one’s adversary with exit doors when, as Iran has certainly done, it paints itself into a diplomatic corner. We have offered the regime a path for direct dialogue, and with the passage of the new UN resolution we will reaffirm that this path remains open. We hope the Iranian regime will seek a constructive end to its isolation and choose to meet us at the negotiating table. Javier Solana has begun, on behalf of the P-5 countries and Germany, an active effort to convince the Iranian government to reconsider our negotiating offer.

We are responding to the challenge of a nuclear-armed Iran with a comprehensive strategy that relies on American diplomatic leadership and the creation over the last two years of a robust multilateral coalition. First and foremost, we have made clear to the Iranian regime that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail painful costs, including financial hardship, diplomatic isolation, and long-term detriment to Iran’s prestige and fundamental national interests. Secondly, and equally important, we have worked to alter the regime’s actions and behavior and convince it that another, more constructive course is available to it.

We have seen both elements of this strategy play out over the past week at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where we joined our European partners—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—as well as Russia, and China in putting forward a robust new sanctions resolution that was adopted by the full Council on March 24. Iran must now face the fact that it is isolated nearly without friends in the world. In last week’s vote, the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, one of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) leaders, South Africa, and an Arab neighbor, Qatar, all voted against it. This second Chapter VII resolution in three months was a resounding repudiation of Iran’s radical nuclear course. This resolution builds on the elements of Resolution 1737, which was a significant milestone following two full years of patient diplomacy among the United States, our European partners, Russia, and China, and represented a crucial turning point in international willingness to pressure the Iranian regime to comply with its obligations.

In addition to reaffirming the requirements set out in UNSCR 1737, the new resolution is substantially stronger than the first in establishing new sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Command (IRGC), on Iran’s fifth largest bank, Bank Sepah, and on introducing for the first time, measures to reduce countries’ export credits made available to stimulate trade with Iran. The resolution establishes additional travel restrictions for Iranians involved in nuclear and ballistic missile programs; expands the number of individuals and organizations subject to travel restrictions and assets freeze; imposes a ban on Iranian arms exports (including to Hizballah and Hamas); urges countries to limit transfers of some weapons to Iran; and encourages both states and international financial institutions to halt new financial assistance agreements and loans with the Iranian government. All of these measures are carefully targeted to isolate the Iranian regime and make clear to it that it will face increasing costs for its continued defiance.

While we are acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian government, we are also offering to it a diplomatic way forward by seeking engagement with Iran. Secretary Rice and her P-5 Foreign Minister colleagues issued a statement just after the UN resolution passed last week reaffirming our strong desire to find a way to the negotiating table. Javier Solana has reached out to the Iranian government on our behalf to attempt once again to convince Iran to join the talks. For this reason, Secretary Rice has agreed to join her P5+1 colleagues in direct discussions with Iran regarding the nuclear and other issues “at any place and at any time,” provided Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. This avenue continues to represent the best path for Iran to satisfy the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program, and for Iran and the United States to move toward resolving our differences.

Iran must know that the world is united in our aim to deny it a nuclear weapon. Our coalition is diverse and robust, and it has only grown stronger as Iran’s defiance has persisted. Leading states across the globe – including India, Egypt, and Brazil – supported this effort at the International Atomic Energy Agency. The governments of Russia, China, Japan and our many European allies are committed to our joint effort to thwart Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. The Iranian government finds itself in profound isolation on the nuclear issue.

Outside of the Security Council, we have worked cooperatively with major governments to curtail business transactions tied to Iran’s nuclear activities and support for terrorism. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), we have sanctioned Iran’s Bank Sepah and cut off Iranian state-owned Bank Saderat from all access to the U.S. financial system. As my colleague, Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey and I discussed with the Senate Banking Committee last week, these steps have had a snowball effect, as banks and businesses worldwide are recognizing the serious risk associated with Iran and are beginning to scale back their Iran activities. In 2006, several leading European banks reduced lending to Iran. I expect international financial institutions will make this same choice now that we have passed a second Chapter VII resolution.

We have also acted to blunt Iran’s regional ambitions. In Iraq, Iran continues to provide lethal support to select groups of Shia militants who target and kill U.S. and Coalition troops, as well as innocent Iraqis. We have made clear to Tehran that this is absolutely unacceptable, and our troops on the ground in Iraq are acting to disrupt Iran’s networks in Iraq that provide deadly weapons to Iraqi groups. These actions are consistent with the mandate granted to the Multi-National Forces in Iraq by both the United Nations Security Council and the Iraqi Government to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq’s security and stability. We have an absolute and indisputable obligation to defend our soldiers from such attacks.

At the same time, we are supporting the Iraqi Government’s efforts to solicit international support for stabilizing Iraq. To this end, the United States joined representatives of Iraq’s neighbors and the P5 in Baghdad on March 10 as part of an Iraqi-led effort to discuss strategies to end bloodshed and sectarianism. We hope Iran will commit itself to a constructive and positive role in Iraq as a result of those discussions, and along with other neighbors it will work for peace and stability in the region. We expect these discussions with all of Iraq’s neighbors and other concerned countries to resume in the near future.

We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora’s democratically elected government in Lebanon, to enforce the arms embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 1701, and to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf, not to provoke Iran, but to reassure our friends in the region that it remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level, Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, regarding issues of shared concern, including most especially the threat posed by Iran.

Combined with our long-term efforts to promote peace and stability in the region and reassure allies, including Israel, these steps mark the natural evolution of our efforts to demonstrate international resolve against Iran’s disregard for international law and its aspirations to dominate the region. And they have all had an impact. Iran is now more isolated and under more intense international scrutiny than ever before.

Part of charting a new course for U.S.-Iranian relations is intensifying our engagement with the Iranian people. While it is now not feasible for us to have formal diplomatic relations with Iran, it is within our grasp to bridge the divide between our peoples. So in addition to our diplomatic efforts to persuade Tehran to alter its foreign policy, we have launched a program to increase contacts between the American and Iranian peoples. We sent the U.S. National Wresting Team to compete in Iran in January; we are also bringing hundreds of Iranians on exchange programs to the United States. These efforts have been helped tremendously by Congressional support for the Administration’s 2006 supplemental funding request. In the long-term, assuaging the separation between our peoples is critical to overcoming the nearly 30-years estrangement that currently divides the U.S. from Iran.

Our diplomatic success vis-à-vis Tehran, and the endurance and vitality of our international coalition, are no small achievements. They reflect the leadership of President Bush and the sustained efforts of Secretary Rice, the State Department, and contributions from other government agencies. As the President and Secretary Rice have reiterated—and I cannot emphasize this enough—we seek a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran.

Today, I would like to provide some details on the additional steps we are pursuing at the United Nations and bilaterally to increase pressure on Iran to abandon its quest for a nuclear weapons capability. I will also touch briefly on our continued efforts to discourage the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism and extremism, while expanding engagement with the Iranian people.

IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - The greatest immediate threat posed by the Iranian regime is its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. For some 18 years, Iranian leaders pursued a clandestine enrichment program and other undeclared nuclear activities in violation of their international obligations. It is this continued abuse of the world’s trust that is at the heart of the international community’s impasse with Iran.

The United States and the entire permanent membership of the UN Security Council recognize Iran’s right to peaceful, civil nuclear energy under relevant articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, that right comes with responsibilities, paramount among them a legal obligation to forgo the pursuit of nuclear weapons and to subject all nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. As IAEA Director General ElBaradei’s most recent report to the Security Council makes clear, the Iranian regime remains in noncompliance with its international obligations and has been anything but transparent. Despite multiple requests over more than three years, the regime has yet to clarify several outstanding issues and the IAEA is unable to verify that Iran’s program is solely peaceful.

A review of Dr. ElBaradei’s report is instructive and alarming. Iran has repeatedly failed not only to meet the IAEA’s requirements; it has also failed to even have the courtesy of responding to many of the IAEA’s direct questions on behalf of a concerned international community.

The regime has refused to enable the IAEA to clarify the past history of its P1/P2 centrifuge work, plutonium separation experiments, and uranium contamination. It has refused to agree to IAEA requests for access to Iranian officials and documentation, including a 15-page document that describes the procedures for casting and machining uranium into hemispheres, for which the only plausible purpose is manufacturing nuclear weapons. And it has refused to accept and implement the safeguards measures that the IAEA believes are necessary to ensure non-diversion of enriched uranium at the Natanz enrichment plant.

The Iranian regime has, of course, had sufficient time to clarify questions regarding its nuclear activities. Since 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors has called on Iran to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The UN Security Council called on Iran several times—both in March 2006 and again in July 2006—to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to cooperate with the IAEA’s ongoing inspections. Iran, however, ignored these requests as well as the generous P5+1 incentives package offered last June. Faced with the Iranian regime’s blatant disregard for its international nuclear obligations, the UN Security Council had no choice but to unanimously adopt Resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006, and 1747 on March 24, 2007. If Iran does not comply with UN Resolution 1747 by May 24, it will be subject to even stronger sanctions in a third resolution. And in the face of Iran’s continued defiance, we expect that the Council will continue to incrementally increase pressure on Iran.

While President Ahmadi-Nejad continues to scorn the Security Council’s efforts and declare its Resolutions “torn pieces of paper,” we have observed that the international community is increasingly determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. We see evidence of this in our unprecedented cooperation with our European partners at the UNSC—cooperation one country recently described as “the best in more than a decade.” We see evidence of this in Russia’s decision to suspend cooperation on the Bushehr reactor until Iran complies with its international obligations. And we see evidence of this in the international community’s concerted efforts to implement these two Chapter VII sanctions resolutions and cooperate on other financial measures outside of the UNSC framework.

FINANCIAL PRESSURES - Over the past several months, Treasury Department Under Secretary Stuart Levey and I have engaged with foreign governments and private firms, reminding them of the financial and reputational risks of doing business with Iran. Iran is one of the largest beneficiaries of official export credits and guarantees, with $22.3 billion in exposure reported by OECD countries as of the end of 2005. Noting that a number of major international banks have now reduced their business with Iran, we are also encouraging governments in Europe and Asia to reduce the official export credits they provide to Iran. Governments should not take on the financial risk that private companies are facing in that country. Europe should now repudiate a business as usual approach with Iran. Many countries share our concerns and are starting to decrease their official lending.

Some countries have capped their exposure at current levels, while others have begun scrutinizing Iranian credit applications to ensure they comply with the strict, nonproliferation guidelines contained in Resolution 1737. France, Germany, and Japan have reduced export credits limits sharply for Iran, while others have committed privately to doing the same, and especially, reducing the medium and long-term credits that Iran uses for capital goods and project finance.

Under domestic legal authorities, we have designated Iranian entities associated with Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, effectively denying them access to the U.S. financial system. Termination of Iran-based Bank Sepah and Bank Saderat’s ability to conduct transactions in dollars has further limited that access and we are asking other nations to follow our lead.

We also worked last year with Congress on the reauthorization and amendment of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which, thanks to the success of our diplomatic and economic efforts with respect to Libya, is now simply the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). ISA has been valuable in emphasizing to foreign government our concerns about Iran and highlighting the risks of investing there. Indeed, we attribute the continued lack of investment in Iran’s oil and gas sectors, in part, to ISA. We could not support, however, modifications to this act now being circulated in Congress that would turn the full weight of sanctions not against Iran but against our allies that are instrumental in our coalition against Iran.

We will continue to engage relevant companies and countries regarding their potential investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector. In making clear our opposition to such deal, we have emphasized how they would undermine international efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, as well as the legal implications of future investment under our law. Most of these deals remain in the negotiation stage. Our discussions are intended to diminish the likelihood of seeing them finalized. More broadly, Iran continues to encounter great difficulties in attracting foreign investment to its hydrocarbon sector and few foreign companies have committed to developing Iranian oil and gas fields. Iran’s own behavior and policies have contributed to this situation, but ISA has also helped.

The net-effect of these efforts, along with those at the UN, has been to make it more difficult for the Iranian regime to funds its illegal nuclear efforts.

CURBING IRAN’S DESTABILIZING ACTIONS ABROAD - Looking beyond its nuclear aspirations, the Iranian regime’s aggressive foreign policy and hegemonic aspirations constitute an increasing threat to regional security and U.S. interests.

I noted in my opening remarks our serious concerns regarding Iran’s lethal support to Iraqi militants, and the steps we are taking to counter thee destructive activities in Iraq. But Iranian interference is also evident in Lebanon, where its efforts to rearm and financially bolster Hizballah threaten to set back the democratic progress of the past two years. President Ahmadi-Nejad’s repeated threats to “wipe Israel off of the map,” and the regime’s internationally condemned Holocaust denial conference in December, highlight regime hostility toward a major U.S. partner and a United Nations member-state—as does continued Iranian financial and military support to Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

As Secretary Rice noted during recent testimony to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, we are intensifying our efforts to lay the foundation for a Palestinian state that can exist peacefully alongside Israel. We have also enhanced our support to Lebanon’s democratically elected government, and will sustain our efforts to enforce all applicable UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the rearmament of Hizballah. Secretary Rice’s trip to the Middle East this week sought to achieve these important objectives.

More broadly, we are enhancing our security cooperation with longstanding partners throughout the region. The deployment of a second aircraft carrier battle group to the Gulf reinforces these efforts, reassures our allies, and underscores to Tehran our commitment to protect our vital interests.

BLOCKING IRAN’S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM - No discussion of Iran would be complete without mentioning the regime’s long and established record of supporting terrorism.

Tehran has long been the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism; the regime sponsored and was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans in the 1980s and 1990s. Through its efforts to rearm Hizballah, the Iranian regime has violated its obligations under UNSCR 1701 and it has violated UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions by failing to impose sanctions on al-Qaida and continues to refuse to bring to justice or confirm the whereabouts of senior al-Qaida members it detained in 2003.

Recognizing Iran’s role as the central banker of global terrorism, the Departments of State and the Treasury have enlisted foreign support in efforts to deny suspect Iranian individuals and entities access to the international financial system. The termination of Iranian Bank Saderat’s “U-turn” authorization effectively prohibits one of Iran’s largest banks from conducting business in U.S. dollars.

Utilizing E.O. 13224, Treasury has also designated two entities (Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company for Finance and Investment) that have functioned as Hizballah’s unofficial treasury by holding and investing the group’s assets and serving as intermediaries between the terrorist organization and international banks. Additionally, we have disrupted Hizballah’s financial support network by designating and blocking the assets of individuals and two entities affiliated with Hizballah in the Tri-Border region of South America.

EMPOWERING IRANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY - Before I conclude, I would like to discuss briefly the Iranian regime’s repressive treatment of its own people. The regime recently celebrated the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution. But the history of the past 28 years has been a betrayal of the aspirations of the Iranian people.

The regime’s record of human rights abuse remains among the worst in the world. As our recently released annual Human Rights Report emphasizes, this record has worsened over the past year. The regime denies its people freedom of expression by cracking down on journalists and bloggers, closing independent newspapers, censoring internet use and blocking satellite dish ownership—all in an effort to control its citizens’ access to information. These actions prompt a basic question: why is this regime so afraid of its own people?

We believe the Iranian people deserve better from their leaders. To counter the regime’s abuses, we are promoting greater freedom in Iran by funding a variety of civil society programs.

As a result of the generous $66.1 million in funding from Congress in the FY 06 Supplemental, we have implemented a wide range of democracy, educational, and cultural programs, as well as significantly expanded our efforts to improve the free flow of information to the Iranian people. $20 million of these funds are going to support civil society, human rights, democratic reform and related outreach, while $5 million was given to the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) for increased Persian language electronic and speaker programming about American society, institutions, policy and values. An additional $5 million was allocated to the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) for new cultural and educational exchange programs to increase mutual understanding between our two peoples. The Congress allocated the remaining $36.1 million of FY 2006 supplemental Iran funds directly to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) for media programming into Iran, including our VOA Farsi television service and Radio Farda.

Our programs are open to all who are committed to peaceful, democratic progress in Iran. Their goal is to support different parts of Iranian society by promoting basic human rights and religious freedoms; building civil society; improving justice, accessibility and the rule of law; and promoting a deeper understanding of our culture, values, and ideas.

Given Iran’s restricted political climate, progress toward our goals has been predictably difficult. But we are moving forward, and many brave men and women are helping promote basic civil rights and the necessity of political dialogue. In the long-term, we hope that a more open political climate that encourages, rather represses, dialogue, will stimulate a change in the behavior of the Iranian Government.

ENGAGING THE IRANIAN PEOPLE - State Department officials are also reaching out to the Iranian people to convey our policies. Secretary Rice and I have given interviews on Persian language media highlighting the Iranian people’s aspirations for increased respect for human rights and civil liberties, as well as a more democratic, open government.

With the recently appropriated funds, the United States has resumed official educational and cultural exchange programs between the United States and Iran, which the U.S. Government suspended at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. In late 2006, a group of medical professionals were the first Iranians to visit the United States as part of this reinvigorated effort. Their non-political visit brought them in contact with medical professionals from the Centers for Disease Control, Harvard Medical School, and other major medical institutions. Several professional, athletic, and cultural exchanges are planned for 2007, with the goal of building greater understanding between the people of the United States and of Iran. Additionally, we are encouraging American athletes, artists, religious leaders and others to visit Iran, as well, to help promote greater mutual understanding. It is our hope that increased exchanges will provide the Iranian people with a clearer and more accurate understanding of American society, culture and democratic values.

For FY 2008, the President has requested over $100 million in Iran funding, including roughly $20 million for VOA’s Persian service and $8.1 million for Radio Farda, as well as $5.5 for consular affairs, and $75 million in economic support funds to civil society and human rights projects in Iran. We appreciate the Committee’s continued support of efforts in these areas which are a vital component of our comprehensive Iran strategy.

CONCLUSION - The United States is committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran and we are making every effort to improve U.S.-Iranian relations. But that cannot happen without a change in the Iranian regime’s actions and policies.

Secretary Rice offered the Iranian Government an extraordinary opportunity, in June 2006, when she pledged to engage in direct talks alongside Russian, China, and our European partners if Iran verifiably suspends enrichment and cooperates with the IAEA. This offer remains on the table, and we will continue to make clear to the Iranian regime that the best to way to ensure its security is by complying with, not ignoring its international nuclear obligations and by seeking peace through negotiations with the U.S. and our partners. As the President has stated, we look forward to the day when the Iranian people live in freedom and America and Iran can be good friends and close partners in the cause of peace.

Released on March 29, 2007

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